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INTERNATIONAL CHILD LABOR
REGULATION 101: WHAT CORPORATIONS
NEED TO KNOW ABOUT TREATIES
PERTAINING TO WORKING YOUTH
INTRODUCTION

T

he decision in Roe v. Bridgestone Corp.1 has signaled that transnational corporations2 (“TNCs”) that have sufficient minimum contacts with the United States3 may be subject to liability in U.S. courts for
international child labor violations committed abroad. This liability may
arise under the Alien Tort Statute4 (“ATS”), which allows aliens to bring
claims in U.S. courts for torts in violation of an international treaty or the
law of nations.5 In Bridgestone, Liberian workers alleged6 that their corporate employer7 at the Firestone rubber plantation near Harbel, Liberia,8
encouraged or even required them to put their children to work in order
to meet extremely high production quotas.9 At the plantation, children as
young as six years old allegedly tapped raw latex from rubber trees, ap1. Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988 (S.D. Ind. 2007).
2. As used in this Note, “transnational corporation” means a business entity that
operates in at least two countries. Seventy-eight thousand TNCs and their 780,000 foreign affiliates account for one-third of world exports and the equivalent of ten percent of
the world’s gross domestic product. U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT
REPORT 2007: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES AND DEVELOPMENT, at xvi, U.N.Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2007, U.N. Sales No. E.07.II.D.9 (2007).
3. See WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (holding that the forum state may not exercise in personam jurisdiction over a defendant that
did not establish minimum contacts with the state).
4. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
5. Id.
6. The plaintiffs asserted claims under the ATS, Thirteenth Amendment, California
law, and 18 U.S.C. § 1595 (a federal statute authorizing civil actions for criminal forced
labor violations), but these claims were dismissed. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F.Supp. 2d at
1024.
7. Bridgestone Corporation is headquartered in Japan and, along with its consolidated subsidiaries, is the world’s largest manufacturer of tires and rubber products.
BRIDGESTONE GROUP, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 1, 79 (2008).
8. Harbel, Margibi County is situated about thirty-seven miles from Monrovia, the
capital of Liberia. U.N. MISSION IN LIBERIA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN LIBERIA’S RUBBER
PLANTATIONS: TAPPING INTO THE FUTURE 20, 72–73 (2006).
9. According to the pleadings, workers at the Firestone plantation cut rubber trees
with a machete to allow the raw latex to drip into cups mounted on the trees, collected the
latex from the cups into buckets, and brought the latex to the collection location carrying
two, seventy-five-pound buckets at a time. To earn a daily wage equivalent to $3.19, a
worker must collect latex from 1125 trees. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F.Supp. 2d at 991,
994.
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plied pesticides to the trees without any protective equipment, and performed other “back-breaking” work.10 The employer moved to dismiss
for failure to state a claim, but the court denied the motion and concluded
that these allegations, if proven, may give rise to a violation of international law.11 As the Bridgestone litigation continues, TNCs are confronted with the need to identify international child labor standards so as
to avoid liability.
In addition to the risk of liability, failure of TNCs or TNCs’ suppliers
to comply with international child labor standards may pose reputational
risks. An incident involving Gap Inc., an international apparel, accessories, and personal care products retailer,12 illustrates this point. In October of 2007, in an article entitled “Child Sweatshop Shame Threatens
Gap’s Ethical Image,” the U.K. newspaper, The Observer, reported that
Gap Inc. had received merchandise from a factory in India where children as young as ten years old worked sixteen hours a day without pay.13
In response, Gap Inc. issued a press release stating that Gap Inc. discontinued the work order placed with that factory.14 The press release, however, was silent on the future fate of child laborers and whether they in
fact continued working at that factory after Gap Inc. discovered the violations.15 This raises the question of how TNCs should respond to child
labor incidents to assure compliance with international law.
This Note analyzes the treaty law pertaining to the child labor issues
involved in the Bridgestone litigation and the Gap Inc. incident. To be
clear, long before Bridgestone, businesses that conducted activities in a
foreign jurisdiction could be subject to liability under that jurisdiction’s
domestic laws.16 This Note examines child labor standards imposed by
10. Id. at 988, 991, 994, 1019, 1021.
11. Id. at 1021.
12. Gap Inc., Company Fact Sheet, http://www.gapinc.com/public/About/abt_fact_
sheet.shtml (last visited Oct. 23, 2008).
13. Dan McDougall, Child Sweatshop Shame Threatens Gap’s Ethical Image,
OBSERVER, Oct. 28, 2007, available at http://observer.guardian.co.uk/world/story/0,,
2200573,00.html.
14. Press Release, Gap Inc., Gap Inc. Issues Statement on Media Reports on Child
Labor (Oct. 28, 2007).
15. See id.
16. Compare Chadwick v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 656 F. Supp. 857 (D. Del. 1987)
(applying Saudi Arabian law to the issues of vicarious liability, existence of an employeremployee relationship, and the validity of third-party claims that arose in Saudi Arabia),
with RCA OMS, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 228 (1973) (finding that the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151–69, including the Labor Management Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 141 et seq., does not extend extraterritorially to a U.S. employer in Greenland,
despite the fact that the employees were hired in the United States, underwent U.S. security clearance, were paid from the United States, and returned to the United States upon
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international law, which historically has been shaped by17 treaties,18 customary international law,19 and the general principles of law.20 In recent
years, “a mushrooming of international norms and institutions”21 has
embraced other categories, such as peremptory norms22 and “soft law.”23
While various sources of international law may relate to the problem of
international child labor,24 this Note focuses on treaties and conventions,

finishing the job). See also Felice Morgenstern & Blaise Knapp, Multinational Enterprises and the Extraterritorial Application of Labour Law, 27 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 769
(1978) (discussing extraterritorial application of domestic labor law).
17. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1031, T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
18. A treaty is “an international agreement concluded between States in written form
and governed by international law.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art.
2(1)(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
19. Customary international law is “evidence of a general practice accepted as law.”
ICJ Statute, supra note 18, art. 38(1)(b). See also ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 153, 156 (2d ed. 2005) (discussing customary international law).
20. The general principles of law “emanate from principles endorsed by the developed domestic legal systems of different [S]tates.” G.M. DANILENKO, LAW-MAKING IN
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 177 (1993). An example of the general principles of law
is the principle of good faith. BING CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 105–58 (1987).
21. Janet Koven Levit, Bottom-Up International Lawmaking: Reflections on the New
Haven School of International Law, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 393, 410 (2007).
22. A jus cogens, or a peremptory, norm is “a norm accepted and recognized by the
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international
law having the same character.” Vienna Convention, supra note 18, art. 53. The prohibition on genocide is an example of a jus cogens norm. CASSESE, supra note 19, at 155,
199–212; THEODOR MERON, THE HUMANIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 392–98 (2006).
23. The term “soft law” refers to sources of law other than treaties and custom, for
example, instruments generated by international bodies, nongovernmental organizations,
and TNCs. Jan Klabbers, The Undesirability of Soft Law, 67 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 381, 385
(1998); Levit, supra note 21, at 413–12.
24. See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Economic Globalization and the Rise of Efficient
Systems of Global Private Law Making: Wal-Mart as Global Legislator, 39 CONN. L.
REV. 1739 (2007) (assessing the role of TNCs in developing international standards of
corporate behavior); Madeleine Grey Bullard, Child Labor Prohibitions Are Universal,
Binding, and Obligatory Law: The Evolving State of Customary International Law Concerning the Unempowered Child Laborer, 24 HOUS. J. INT’L. L. 139 (2001) (analyzing
child labor standards as a matter of international customary law); A.C.L. Davies, Should
the EU Have the Power to Set Minimum Standards for Collective Labour Rights in the
Member States, in LABOUR RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS 177 (Philip Alston ed., 2005) (discussing the role of the supranational legislature in the European Union in establishing
labor standards).
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which, at least until recently, have represented the strongest form of international legal obligations.25
This Note argues that child labor, as a problem of social and economic
development, requires TNCs to act proactively. Often, after exposure in
the media for its association with a supplier that uses child labor, a U.S.
or other Western company will impulsively discontinue its relationship
with the supplier or require that child laborers be dismissed from the
supplier’s production.26 This reactive approach does not squarely address
the issues that child labor raises and may be inconsistent with the principles of children’s human rights. Where a TNC detects incidents of
child labor, the TNC should focus on creating meaningful alternatives for
children dismissed from work.
This Note proceeds in five parts. Part I examines the phenomenon of
child labor and the role of domestic and international law in child labor
regulation. Part II analyzes the child labor standards adopted by the International Labour Organization (“ILO”),27 including the Worst Forms of
Child Labor Convention.28 Part III discusses the human rights of economically active children, as codified in the Convention on the Rights of
the Child.29 Part IV addresses the significance of child labor standards set
forth in U.S. free trade agreements (“FTAs”). Part V concludes the analysis and provides recommendations and planning considerations for the
implementation of international child labor standards in TNCs’ corporate
compliance programs.
I. CHILD LABOR AS AN INTERNATIONAL CONCERN
Today one in seven children in the world works.30 The term “child”
generally refers to a person under the age of eighteen,31 and the “eco25. JAMES AVERY JOYCE, WORLD LABOUR RIGHTS AND THEIR PROTECTION 21 (1980).
26. See John Schmid, Guatemalan Kohl’s Apparel-Maker Signs Labor Pledge,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 2, 2007, available at http://www.nlcnet.org/article.php?id=412
(quoting Charles Kernaghan of the National Labor Committee, a U.S. nongovernmental
organization, who has pointed out that when a U.S. company, in order to avoid the association with a sweatshop, withdraws its orders, “the workers [at the sweatshop] get doubly punished”).
27. The ILO is a specialized agency of the United Nations responsible for social and
labor issues, such as the right to work and social security. JOYCE, supra note 25, at 29; N.
VALTICOS, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR LAW 19 (1979).
28. ILO Convention (No. 182) Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for
the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor, June 17, 1999, S. TREATY DOC. NO.
106-5 (1999), 2133 U.N.T.S.161 [hereinafter Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention].
29. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
30. Seven out of ten working children harvest crops and tend livestock in agriculture.
Twenty-two percent of working children are in the services sector, where some of them
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nomic activities” of children are understood to encompass various productive functions, paid and unpaid, formal and informal, legal and illegal.32 In this context, as the Bridgestone court has pointed out, “national
and international norms accommodate a host of different situations”
where children’s work is acceptable.33 This raises the issue of defining
prohibited activities encompassed by the term “child labor.”
A. Defining “Child Labor”
Children’s economic activities exist within a continuum. On one end of
the continuum are various exploitative forms of labor, such as the bonded
labor allegedly involved in the Gap Inc. incident.34 Bonded labor, common in South Asia, arises when an indebted family puts their children to
work to pay off the debt.35 As bonded children work for nominal wages
and the creditor typically retains the major part of the wages as interest,36
which may be as high as sixty percent, the bondage status may pass to
the next generation.37 On the other end of the continuum are activities of
children who were fortunate to become apprentices in trades, which is
are informally employed as domestic workers who prepare meals, wash dishes, or care
for little children. Nine percent are in the industry sector, which includes construction,
manufacturing, and mining. Human Rights Watch, Child Domestics: The World
of Invisible Workers (2004), http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/06/10/africa8789.htm [hereinafter Child Domestics]; Int’l Labour Org. [ILO], Facts on Child Labour
2006 (2006), available at http://www.ilo.org/ipecinfo/product/viewProduct.do?product
Id=2899; ILO, World Day Against Child Labour (2007), available at http://www.ilo.org/
ipecinfo/product/viewProduct.do?productId=4048.
31. Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, supra note 28, art. 2; Convention on the
Rights of the Child, supra note 29, art. 1 (providing that “a child means every human
being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier”).
32. The term “economic activity” “encompasses most productive activities undertaken by children, whether for the market or not, paid or unpaid, for a few hours or full
time, on a causal or regular basis, legal or illegal; it excludes chores undertaken in the
child’s own household or schooling.” ILO, International Labour Conference, May 31–
June 16, 2006, Report of the Director-General, The End of Child Labour: Within Reach,
Global Report Under the Follow-up to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles
and Rights at Work, at 6, Rep. I(B), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/
relm/ilc/ilc95/pdf/rep-i-b.pdf [hereinafter ILO, The End of Child Labour].
33. Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1020 (S.D. Ind. 2007).
34. McDougall, supra note 13.
35. A. Yasmine Rassam, International Law and Contemporary Forms of Slavery: An
Economic and Social Rights-Based Approach, 23 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 818, 820–24
(2005).
36. WORLD VISION UK, OFFERING HOPE, NOT DESPAIR: ERADICATING CHILD LABOUR
WITHOUT PUTTING CHILDREN WORKERS ON THE STREETS 17 (1997).
37. Rassam, supra note 35, at 821.
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sometimes the only realistic way to learn vocational skills in some countries.38 In India, for example, children in families of artisans, craftsmen,
and farmers traditionally join their family trade and learn while working
alongside the family members.39 The question then becomes what factors
can distinguish “child labor” from other economic activities of children.
In order to answer this question, it is helpful to identify the concerns
that child labor raises and the policies underlying the child labor prohibition. One concern is the children’s health and well-being. For example,
in Bangladesh alone, fifty child laborers are injured by machinery daily,
and three of those fifty become permanently disabled.40 Another concern
is the exploitation of children, as in Guatemala and El Salvador, where
tens of thousands of domestic servants as young as eight years of age
work ninety-hour weeks.41 Working children are also often deprived of
educational opportunities, for example, in rural areas in Mexicali Valley,
Mexico, where child labor is common and school attendance during the
harvesting season drops significantly.42 Entering the workforce too early
reduces the children’s future earnings by thirteen to twenty percent43 and
hardly benefits the domestic economy because children are generally less
productive than adults.44 Ultimately, the child labor prohibition aims to

38. Michael Bonnet, Child Labour in Africa, 132 INT’L LAB. REV. 371, 385–87
(1993).
39. Shahana Dasgupta, Child Welfare Legislation in India: Will Indian Children Benefit from the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 11 MICH. J. INT’L L.
1301, 1308 (1990).
40. ILO, World Day Against Child Labour, supra note 30. In developing countries,
the rate of injury and illness of working children ranges from twelve percent (for boys in
agriculture) to thirty-five percent (for girls in construction). ILO, Child Labour in Africa
(2005), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1009
&context=child.
41. Child Domestics, supra note 30.
42. DAVID BACON, THE CHILDREN OF NAFTA: LABOR WARS ON THE U.S./MEXICO
BORDER 33 (2004).
43. ILO, The End of Child Labour, supra note 32, at 24.
44. Employers in certain industries attempt to justify child labor under the “nimble
fingers” theory, which holds that children are more productive than adults in carrying out
certain tasks, such as manual tasks that require dexterity. This theory, however, would
not be defensible “were it not for the fact that child labor is much cheaper, more subservient, and therefore better exploited by employers.” M. Neil Browne et al., Universal
Moral Principles and the Law: The Failure of One-Size-Fits-All Child Labor Laws, 27
HOUS. J. INT’L L. 1, 28–29 (2004). See also Savitri Goonesekere, The Best Interests of the
Child: A South Asian Perspective, in THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: RECONCILING
CULTURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 117, 143 (Philip Alston ed., 1994) (discussing Mehta v.
State of Tamil Nadu, a 1990 decision of the Supreme Court of India, which held that the
need for children’s work in the matches industry in Sivakasi outweighed the concern for
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eliminate practices that impede children’s development and education.45
As a matter of social policy, the child labor prohibition ensures the development of human capital and, consequently, long-term social and
economic growth.46
The prohibition of child labor, however, does not discourage children
from contributing to the family’s budget, learning vocational skills and
participating in communal life through their economic activities.47 Daily,
some 30,000 children worldwide die as a result of extreme poverty,48 and
thus, children’s economic activities may be essential to their survival. A
factory in Kutsia, Bangladesh, for instance, dismissed orphans who were
too young to work.49 These children eventually attempted to return to the
factory by bribing the supervisors or by staying on after bringing lunch to
their elder siblings because it was the children’s only opportunity to earn
a living.50 In addition, through their productive activities, children integrate into the community, as in Africa, where children as young as ten
years old begin imitating their family members in the household and
farm tasks, and then move to other tasks, including serving the elders in
their community.51 As such, notions about the appropriateness of children’s economic activities vary among countries.

their well-being since “tender hands of children are more suited to the sorting out of the
manufactured product, and processing it for purposes of packing”).
45. See Ranjan K. Agarwal, The Barefoot Lawyers: Prosecuting Child Labour in the
Supreme Court of India, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 665, 676 (2004) (discussing the
effects of child labor on children’s schooling and vocational training). See also Beatrice
Adenike Oloko, Children’s Work in Urban Nigeria: A Case Study of Young Lagos Street
Traders, in PROTECTING WORKING CHILDREN 13–21 (William E. Myers ed., 1991) (discussing the impact of children’s involvement in street trading on their academic achievement).
46. Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, Enforcing International Labor Standards: The Potential
of the Alien Tort Claims Act, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 203, 246–47 (2004).
47. See Breen Creighton, Combating Child Labour: The Role of International Labour
Standards, 18 COMP. LAB. L.J. 362, 363 (1997) (providing examples of children’s work
that is not abusive or exploitative); ILO, World Day Against Child Labour, supra note 30
(discussing child labor in agriculture and pointing out that not all work negatively affects
children).
48. ILO, The End of Child Labour, supra note 32, at 1.
49. JEREMY SEABROOK, CHILDREN OF OTHER WORLDS: EXPLOITATION IN THE GLOBAL
MARKET 23 (2001).
50. Id.
51. Bonnet, supra note 38, at 377. See also B. Rwezaura, The Concept of the Child’s
Best Interest in the Changing Economic and Social Context of Sub-Saharan Africa, in
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: RECONCILING CULTURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra
note 44, at 82, 89–92 (discussing economic activities of children in Sub-Saharan Africa).
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B. The Role of Domestic Law in Regulating Child Labor
Child labor laws originally developed in domestic legal systems52 and
reflected domestic ideology, economy, and culture. In the United States,
for example, the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act was adopted after the
Lochner53 era of free labor ideology54 and left the entire agricultural sector unregulated.55 Today, this federal statute56 outlaws only “oppressive”57 child labor and, generally, sets fourteen as the minimum age for
nonagricultural work, but exempts from regulation children’s work at
family-owned businesses and farms, as performers and babysitters, and
in certain other settings.58 In India, in turn, where child labor is common,59 the 1986 Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act restricts
employment of children under fourteen only in specific occupations and
52. Rajani Kanta Das, Child Labour in India I, 28 INT’L LAB. REV. 796, 811, 814
(1933).
53. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down a New York statute that
limited work hours for bakers as violating the rights to property and contractual autonomy implicated in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution). Cf. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding the constitutional validity of the minimum wage law of the State of Washington).
54. Horacio Spector, Philosophical Foundations of Labor Law, 33 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1119, 1122 (2006).
55. HUGH D. HINDMAN, CHILD LABOR: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 85 (2002).
56. Individual States within the United States may promulgate more protective child
labor laws. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor Employment Standards Admin., State Labor Laws,
http://www.dol.gov/esa/whd/state/state.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2008) (summarizing labor
laws in individual U.S. States).
57. The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(l) (2006), defines “oppressive
child labor” as follows:
[A] condition of employment under which (1) any employee under the age of
sixteen years is employed by an employer (other than a parent or a person
standing in place of a parent employing his own child or a child in his custody
under the age of sixteen years in an occupation other than manufacturing or
mining or an occupation found by the Secretary of Labor to be particularly hazardous for the employment of children between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years or detrimental to their health or well-being) in any occupation, or (2)
any employee between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years is employed by
an employer in any occupation which the Secretary of Labor shall find and by
order declare to be particularly hazardous for the employment of children between such ages or detrimental to their health or well-being; but oppressive
child labor shall not be deemed to exist by virtue of the employment in any occupation of any person with respect to whom the employer shall have on file an
unexpired certificate issued and held pursuant to regulations of the Secretary of
Labor certifying that such person is above the oppressive child-labor age.
58. Id. §§ 203, 212, 213(c)–(d), 214.
59. AMARTYA KUMAR SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 114 (2000).
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processes, including tasks characteristic of the South Asian economy
such as the making of beedi (hand-rolled local cigarettes),60 carpetweaving,61 and, as of 2006, working in dhabas (road-side eateries) and
tea-shops.62 These examples demonstrate that individual governments
can tailor their domestic child labor laws to fit into their specific economic and social policies.
Domestic child labor regulation may also respond to unique changes
occurring in a particular jurisdiction. In Russia, for instance, the 1990s
jump from a centrally planned economy to the free-market “gangster capitalism”63 has led to a demographic crisis, which has resulted in a
750,000–800,000 annual population drop64 and the emergence of “street
children”—homeless and orphaned children living in the streets.65 The
2001 Russian Labor Code addresses this crisis by prohibiting employment of children under sixteen66 and affirmatively guarantying thirty-one
60. Beedi are also known as bidi or biri. Manas Bhattacharya et al., Making Ends
Meet: Bidi Workers in India Today, A Study of Four States 1–2, 78 (Int’l Labour Org.,
Sectoral Activities Programme, Working Paper, provisional ed., 2003), available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/sector/papers/food/wp202.pdf. See SEABROOK,
supra note 49, at 23, 65 (discussing bidi).
61. Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, Act No. 61 (1986) (India), available at http://labour.gov.in/cwl/ChildLabour.htm (click on the “Child Labour (Prohibition & Regulation) Act” hyperlink). The Constitution of India provides that “no child
below the age of fourteen years shall be employed to work in any factory or mine or engaged in any other hazardous employment.” INDIA CONST. art. 24. See also Dasgupta,
supra note 39, at 1304–07 (examining the laws of India pertaining to child labor).
62. Ministry of Labour and Employment, Notification, The Gazette of India, Oct. 10,
2006, Extraordinary, No. 1211, 2, pt II, sec.3(ii), S.O. 1742(E), available at http://labour.
nic.in/cwl/clBanningFinalOrder.pdf.
63. GEORGE TSOGAS, LABOR REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 6 (2001).
64. This decrease is a result of a misbalance between the population birth and death
rates. This problem is sometimes referred to as the “lost generation of the 1990s.” A.G.
GLISKOV ET AL., PRAVA I OBJAZANNOSTI NESOVERŠENNOLETNIH (KOMMENTARII K ZAKONODATEL’STVU O PRAVAH NESOVERŠENNOLETNIH I ZAŠČITE ETIH PRAV ) [RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF MINORS (COMMENTARY ON THE LEGISLATURE ON THE RIGHTS OF MINORS AND
PROTECTION THEREOF)] 8–9 (2007).
65. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF INT’L LABOR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR’S 2006 FINDINGS ON THE WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOR 389–90 (2007).
66. Three exceptions to this rule are (1) employment of a child fifteen years or older
who has graduated from or left in accordance with the federal law a basic general (secondary) educational establishment, (2) light work of a fourteen-year-old, not harmful to
the child’s health and education process, with the consent of one parent (guardian or custodian) and the patronage body, outside of school hours, and (3) participation in the creation and/or performance of art works, without any harm to the child’s health and moral
development, in movie, theatre, concert and circus organizations, with the consent of one
parent (guardian or custodian) and the patronage body. Trudovoi Kodeks [TK] [Labor
Code] art. 63 (Russ.), available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/WEBTEXT/60535/
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days of paid vacation to workers under eighteen67 and an annual medical
examination at the employer’s expense.68 The City of Moscow responded
on the local government level by mandating employers with more than a
hundred employees to set a four percent minimum quota for orphans under twenty-three, adolescents under eighteen, and the disabled.69 As individual States and local governments may seem better positioned in designing specific policies with respect to child labor, it is important to address why child labor is also regulated internationally.
C. Regulating Child Labor on the International Level
Parallel with the development of domestic child labor laws, the idea of
international regulation of child labor emerged, and it was supported by
regulatory, economic, and humanitarian arguments.70 Less labor regulation in one country may be a factor in attracting employers from other
parts of the world,71 which, consequently, disadvantages workers in
countries with tougher labor laws, such as developed countries.72 Labor
regulation on the international level curbs such attempts to gain a competitive edge by sacrificing labor protections.73 As for the economic aspect of international child labor regulation, poverty is a significant cause

65252/E01RUS01.htm; O.B. SMIRNOV ET AL., KOMMENTARII K TRUDOVOMU KODEKSU
ROSSIJ-SKOJ FEDERACII [COMMENTARY ON THE LABOR CODE OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION] 160–61 (2007).
67. Trudovoi Kodeks [TK] [Labor Code], supra note 66, art. 267 (“Employees under
[eighteen] years old are granted an annual paid leave of [thirty-one] calendar days at any
time convenient to them.”).
68. Id. art. 266 (“Persons under [eighteen] years old are to be employed only after
preliminary medical survey and are to pass an annual medical survey up to when they
reach [eighteen] years old. The medical surveys specified in the present Article are paid
at the expense of the employer.”).
69. GLISKOV ET AL., supra note 64, at 451; N. N. ŠEPULINA, NOVOE ZAKONODATEL’STVO OB OHRANE TRUDA [THE NEW LEGISALTURE ON LABOR PROTECTION] 172 (2007).
70. VALTICOS, supra note 27, at 17–18.
71. Jonathan P. Hiatt & Deborah Greenfield, The Importance of Core Labor Rights in
World Development, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 39, 41 (2004); Kevin Kolben, Integrative Linkage: Combining Public and Private Regulatory Approaches in the Design of Trade and
Labor Regimes, 48 HARV. INT’L L. J. 203, 206–07 (2007).
72. See TSOGAS, supra note 63, at 19, 35–36; Cleopatra Doumbia-Henry & Eric Gravel, Free Trade Agreements and Labour Rights: Recent Developments, 145 INT’L LAB.
REV. 185, 189 (2006) (discussing the concern about a “protectionist backlash from the
developed countries” in enforcement of labor rights through trade agreements).
73. Doumbia-Henry & Gravel, supra note 72, at 189; Kolben, supra note 71, at 206–
07.
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and, at the same time, a consequence of child labor.74 In developing
countries, where child labor is prevalent,75 this creates a vicious cycle,
and so international regulation of child labor may help to break this
cycle.76 Moreover, labor rights (which in the United States are often referred to as “workers’ rights”)77 involve human rights,78 such as the right
to be free from exploitation.79 These arguments have prompted the gradual development of international child labor regulation, as reflected in
the conventions of the ILO.
II. CHILD LABOR STANDARDS IN THE ILO CONVENTIONS
The ILO is an international body that develops labor standards through
adoption of conventions and recommendations80 and engages govern74. Browne et al., supra note 44, at 26–27. See also Worst Forms of Child Labor
Convention, supra note 28, pmbl. (stating that “child labor is to a great extent caused by
poverty”).
75. Agarwal, supra note 45, at 665. Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest percentage of
economically active children (twenty-six percent), followed by the Asian-Pacific region
(less than twenty percent), and Latin America and the Caribbean (five percent). ILO,
Facts on Child Labour 2006, supra note 30.
76. Kaushik Basu & Pham Hoang Van, The Economics of Child Labor, 88 AM. ECON.
REV. 412, 413 (1998).
77. Philip Alston & James Heenan, Shrinking the International Labor Code: An Unintended Consequence of the 1998 ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work? 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 221, 224 (2004).
78. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits all forms of
slavery and “forced or compulsory labour” and affirms the rights to unionize and to be
free from discrimination. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 8, 22,
26, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. The International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights provides for the right to be free from discrimination, the “right to
work,” the right “to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work,” the right to
unionize, and the right to social security. International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights arts. 2(2), 6–9, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights affirms the equality of “all human beings,” prohibits all forms of slavery, and provides for the “right to work,” “free choice of employment,” “just and favourable conditions of work,” “protection against unemployment,” “equal pay for equal
work,” “just and favorable remuneration,” the right to unionize, and “the right to rest and
leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with
pay.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), at 72–73, 75, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). See also Philip Alston, Labour Rights as Human Rights: The Not So Happy State of the Art, in LABOUR
RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 24, at 1, 2–5 (discussing labor rights as human
rights).
79. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 78, at 72.
80. The ILO conventions have the force of treaties and bind the States that ratify such
conventions. The ILO recommendations are nonbinding policy guidelines. JOYCE, supra
note 25, at 26; TSOGAS, supra note 63, at 43–44.
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ments, employers, and workers in the standard-setting process in a model
known as the “tripartite structure.”81 Prior to 1973, the ILO generated
standards for individual economic sectors, such as industry or agriculture,82 and focused on “child welfare”83 rather than child labor abolition.
The 1973 Minimum Age Convention No. 138,84 which is currently in
force,85 was the first “umbrella”86 convention that covered all economic
sectors87 and identified the goal of child labor abolition.88 The United
States has not ratified this Convention.89 The Convention, however, provides a framework for analyzing the 1999 Worst Forms of Child Labor
Convention, which the United States has ratified.90

81. Constitution of the International Labour Organisation art. 7, Oct. 9, 1946, 62 Stat.
3485, 15 U.N.T.S. 35; JOYCE, supra note 25, at 32–35. As of October 5, 2008, 182 countries are ILO members. Int’l Labour Org., Alphabetical List of ILO Member Countries
(182 Countries), http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/country.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2008).
82. See, e.g., ILO Convention (No. 59) Fixing the Minimum Age for Admission of
Children to Industrial Employment, June 22, 1937, 40 U.N.T.S. 217; ILO Convention
(No. 10) Concerning the Age for Admission of Children to Employment in Agriculture,
Nov. 16, 1921, 38 U.N.T.S. 143; ILO Convention (No. 6) Concerning the Night Work of
Young Persons Employed in Industry, Nov. 28, 1919, 38 U.N.T.S. 93; ILO Convention
(No. 5) Fixing the Minimum Age for Admission of Children to Industrial Employment,
Nov. 28, 1919, 38 L.N.T.S. 81.
83. Constitution of the International Labour Organisation, supra note 81, Annex,
III(h).
84. ILO Convention (No. 138) Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, June 26, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 297 [hereinafter Minimum Age Convention].
85. ILOLEX Database of Int’l Labour Standards, Ratifications by Country or by
Convention, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/newratframeE.htm (last visited Aug. 29,
2008).
86. Int’l Labour Conf., 90th Sess., A Future Without Child Labor, Global Report
under the Follow-up to the ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work, rpt. I(B), 2 (2000), available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DECLARATIONWEB
.DOWNLOAD_BLOB?Var_DocumentID=1566 [hereinafter ILC, A Future Without Child
Labor].
87. Minimum Age Convention, supra note 84, pmbl., art. 1.
88. Id. pmbl., art. 10.
89. ILOLEX Database of Int’l Labour Standards, supra note 85.
90. Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, supra note 28. The United States has
ratified two ILO Conventions: the 1957 Forced Labor Convention and the 1999 Worst
Forms of Child Labor Convention. The standards of the former, as applied to the employment of youth, overlap with those of the latter. Compare ILO Convention (No. 105)
Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor, June 25, 1957, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 88-11
(1963), S. TREATY DOC. NO. 102-3 (1991), 320 U.N.T.S. 291, with Worst Forms of Child
Labor Convention, supra note 28, pmbl. (stating that “some of the worst forms of child
labour are covered by other international instruments, in particular the Forced Labour
Convention, 1930”). ILOLEX Database of Int’l Labour Standards, supra note 85.
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A. The Framework of the Minimum Age Convention No. 138
The 1973 Minimum Age Convention No. 138 distinguishes child labor
from other economic activities of children based on the child’s age and
the work setting. Children under eighteen years old91 generally may not
engage in work “which by its nature or the circumstances in which it is
carried out is likely to jeopardize the health, safety or morals of young
persons.”92 As Recommendation No. 146 accompanying the Convention
provides, the determination regarding the types of work to which this
limitation will apply should take into consideration relevant international
standards, such as those pertaining to the use of dangerous substances
and processes.93 In contrast, States may permit adolescents between thirteen and fifteen years of age to perform “light work,”94 defined as work
that is “not likely to be harmful to their health or development”95 and
does not prejudice children’s education or vocational training.96 This correlation between the child’s age and the type of work created a new
framework for defining child labor across economic sectors.
Despite this progress in defining child labor, the Convention failed to
attract a sufficient number of ratifications at the time of its adoption, especially among the States where child labor was common, such as India,
Indonesia, and Pakistan.97 Developing countries, contending with “ex91. Under the Minimum Age Convention, States may, however, upon consultation
with the concerned organizations of employers and workers, authorize employment or
work of persons from the age of sixteen, “on condition that the health, safety and morals
of the young persons concerned are fully protected and that the young persons have received adequate specific instruction or vocational training in the relevant branch of activity.” Minimum Age Convention, supra note 84, art. 3(3).
92. Id. art. 3(1).
93. ILO Minimum Age Recommendation (No. 146) art. 10(1), June 26, 1973, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?R146.
94. Minimum Age Convention, supra note 84, art. 7(1).
95. Id. art. 7(1)(a).
96. Id. art. 7(1)(b).
97. By 1996, out of 173 ILO members, only forty-nine ratified the Minimum Age
Convention. David M. Smolin, Strategic Choices in the International Campaign Against
Child Labor, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 942, 945 (2000). Indonesia and Pakistan ratified the Convention in 1999 and 2006, respectively. To date, 150 States have ratified the Convention,
excluding India, Liberia, and the United States. ILOLEX Database of Int’l Labour Standards, supra note 85. Approximately only a quarter of all ILO members ratified other
ILO instruments protecting working children, such as conventions requiring employers to
conduct annual medical examinations of children-employees. Id. See, e.g., ILO Convention (No. 124) Concerning Medical Examination of Young Persons for Fitness for Employment Underground in Mines, June 23, 1965, 614 U.N.T.S. 239; ILO Convention (No.
78) Concerning Medical Examination of Children and Young Persons for Fitness for
Employment in Non-Industrial Occupations, Oct. 9, 1946, 78 U.N.T.S. 213.
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plosive population growth, endemic poverty, and lack of adequate infrastructure,”98 found the Convention insufficiently flexible, despite its
“flexibility clauses,”99 because the Convention failed to identify the immediate priorities and a methodology for achieving the goal of child labor abolition.100 As for developed countries, the Convention’s presumption that the work of children under thirteen is impermissible under any
circumstances contradicted the preference of such countries to leave the
part-time work of youth, such as morning newspaper delivery by a
twelve-year-old, in the realm of parental control and public opinion rather than regulation by law.101 Thus, the Minimum Age Convention No.
138 provided a new framework for analyzing child labor, but failed to
achieve international consensus on the issue.
B. The Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention: Reaching a Consensus
In the 1990s, the ILO undertook a “strategic shift”102 in its policy on
child labor and identified the elimination of the worst forms of child labor as a priority. The ILO moved from traditional labor issues, such as
the regulation of work conditions, to criminal law areas, such as child
trafficking and the economic exploitation of children through prostitution
and military recruitment.103 This approach culminated in the 1999 Worst
Forms of Child Labor Convention, a product of the realization that immediate steps needed to be taken to abolish intolerable forms of child
labor.104 One hundred and sixty-five countries, including the United
States, have ratified this Convention.105

98. Creighton, supra note 47, at 388.
99. Id. at 391. Under the Minimum Age Convention, in certain circumstances, States
may exclude limited categories of work from the application of the Convention, and developing countries, in particular, may set the minimum age at fourteen years. In addition,
the Convention does not apply to certain types of work performed as part of children’s
education or training. Minimum Age Convention, supra note 84, art. 2(4), 4, 5(3), 6.
100. Creighton, supra note 47, at 390–92.
101. Id. 386–88.
102. Smolin, supra note 97, at 942.
103. See Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, supra note 28, pmbl., art. 3(a)–(c)
(recognizing “the need to adopt new instruments for the prohibition and elimination of
the worst forms of child labour,” such as trafficking and forced or compulsory military
recruitment of children).
104. Michael J. Dennis, The ILO Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labor, 93
AM. J. INT’L L. 943, 943 (1999); Yoshie Noguchi, ILO Convention No. 182 on the Worst
Forms of Child Labour and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 10 INT’L J. CHILD.
RTS. 355, 355 (2002).
105. ILOLEX Database of Int’l Labour Standards, supra note 85.
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The Convention applies to all persons under eighteen years of age106
and focuses on the abolition of two categories of child labor: the “unconditional worst forms of child labor” and “hazardous work.”107 The unconditional worst forms of child labor include “all forms of slavery or
practices similar to slavery,” debt bondage, and the use of children in
various illicit activities.108 These forms of labor are prohibited unconditionally because improving their conditions would not justify such practices.109 Similarly to the Minimum Age Convention No. 138, hazardous
work encompasses “work which, by its nature or the circumstances in
which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety or morals of
children.”110 The Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention refers to111 a
list of considerations for identifying “hazardous work” as set forth in
ILO Recommendation No. 190.112 These considerations include, without
limitation, exposure to dangerous machinery and substances damaging to
health.113 Because of its focus on the intolerable forms of child labor, the
106. Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, supra note 28, art. 2.
107. The ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Recommendation refers to the forms of
child labor prohibited under Article 3(d) of the Convention as “hazardous work.” ILO
Worst Forms of Child Labour Recommendation (No. 190) art. 3, June 17, 1999, available
at http://www.unhcr.org/home/RSDLEGAL/3ddb6ef34.pdf. Commentators use the term
“unconditional forms worst forms of child labor” to refer to the practices identified in
Article 3(a)–(c) of the Convention. See, e.g., Noguchi, supra note 104, at 358.
108. The unconditional forms of child labor comprise the following:
(a) all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory labour, including forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed
conflict; (b) the use, procuring or offering of a child for prostitution, for the
production of pornography or for pornographic performances; (c) the use, procuring or offering of a child for illicit activities, in particular for the production
and trafficking of drugs as defined in the relevant international treaties.
Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, supra note 28, art. 3(a)–(c).
109. Noguchi, supra note 104, at 358.
110. The Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention replaced the word “jeopardize” in
the definition of “hazardous work” in the Minimum Age Convention with the word
“harm”: “work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children.” Compare Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, supra note 28, art. 3(d) (emphasis added), with Minimum Age Convention, supra note 84, art. 3(1).
111. Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, supra note 28, art. 4(1).
112. ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Recommendation (No. 190), supra note 110,
art. 3.
113. Other relevant considerations are “work which exposes children to physical, psychological or sexual abuse”; “work underground, under water, at dangerous heights or in
confined spaces”; “work with dangerous machinery, equipment and tools, or which involves the manual handling or transport of heavy loads”; “work in an unhealthy environ-
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Convention has limited its scope, but achieved greater acceptance than
the Minimum Age Convention No. 138.114
Unlike its predecessor, the Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention
provides guidance on achieving its goals and mandates a proactive approach to the child labor problem.115 The Convention stresses the need to
“reach out to children at special risk”116 and prevent children from engaging in the worst forms of child labor.117 With respect to children removed from work, the Convention emphasizes the importance of measures for “rehabilitation and social integration”118 and access to free basic
education and vocational training.119 Thus, the Convention makes it clear
that not only should children be protected from certain categories of
work, children should also be protected from the need to work.
Empirical data supports this approach and shows that child labor abolition requires proactive measures that address the root causes of child labor. For example, the bolsa escola program in Brazil provides a monthly
minimum salary to poor families whose children stay in school.120 This
eliminates the need for the children to join the workforce too early and
prevents them from dropping out of school, which has made the program
a success.121 Remedial and educational programs such as bolsa escola
show that the solution to the child labor problem lies in “capacity building”122 measures—steps aimed at enhancing the economy, educational
system, and civic participation in a community.123

ment which may, for example, expose children to hazardous substances, agents or
processes, or to temperatures, noise levels, or vibrations damaging to their health”; and
“work under particularly difficult conditions such as work for long hours or during the
night or work where the child is unreasonably confined to the premises of the employer.”
Id. art. 3.
114. Dennis, supra note 104, at 943.
115. Noguchi, supra note 104, at 360–61.
116. Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, supra note 28, art. 7(2)(d).
117. Id. art. 7(2)(a).
118. Id. art. 7(2)(b).
119. Id. art. 7(2)(c).
120. ILC, A Future Without Child Labor, supra note 86, at 101.
121. Id.
122. WORLD VISION UK, supra note 36, at 10.
123. See SEN, supra note 59, 112–16 (examining the interrelation between markets,
liberty, and labor); Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, Back to the Future: The Imperative of Prioritizing for the Protection of Human Rights in Africa, 47 J. AFRICAN L. 1, 4 (2003) (discussing the role of development in fulfillment of human rights).
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III. HUMAN RIGHTS OF ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE CHILDREN
The Convention on the Rights of the Child,124 which memorializes125
the principles of children’s human rights, identifies two aspects of children’s economic activities. On the one hand, children have the right to be
free from exploitation and involvement in hazardous work,126 as well as
to enjoy rest and leisure.127 On the other hand, children have the rights to
survival128 and an adequate standard of living,129 which are implicated in
situations where children work in order to support themselves and their
families.
The interaction between these two aspects of children’s economic activities can be illustrated by the public debate that surrounded the 1992
Child Labor Deterrence Act130 proposed in the U.S. Congress. This bill
sought to introduce sanctions with respect to imported products made
with child labor131 and, thus, advance children’s right to be free from exploitation. In response to this bill, Bangladeshi local activists asserted
that dismissing children from the garment industry would mean throwing
them into the streets without means of subsistence and effectively forcing

124. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 29. The United States has not
ratified this Convention. The United States has ratified the Optional Protocols to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict
and on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, G.A. Res. 54/263,
Annex I, II, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263 (May 25, 2000). Office of the U.N. High Comm’r
for Human Rights, Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights
Treaties, June 9, 2004, http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf. The United States has expressed four areas of concern pertaining to the Convention, namely, sovereignty, federalism, reproductive rights, and parents’ rights. Lainie Rutkow & Joshua T. Lozman, Suffer
the Children?: A Call for United States Ratification of the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 161, 168, 171–72 (2006). The Convention
may establish principles of customary international law. Bullard, supra note 24.
125. Instruments preceding the Convention on the Rights of the Child include the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, which enumerates ten principles of children’s rights.
Declaration of the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), at 19, U.N. GAOR, 14th
Sess., 841st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/4354 (Nov. 20, 1959).
126. The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that States “recognize the
right of the child to be protected from economic exploitation and from performing any
work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child’s education, or to be
harmful to the child’s health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development.”
Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 29, art. 32.
127. Id. art. 31.
128. Id. art. 6(2).
129. Id. art. 27.
130. Child Labor Deterrence Act, S. 3133, 102nd Cong. (1992).
131. Id. § 5.
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the children into more hazardous occupations,132 which would jeopardize
the children’s rights to survival and an adequate standard of living. In
fact, between 1992 and 1995, Bangladeshi manufacturers dismissed tens
of thousands of children who subsequently became rickshaw pullers,
brick carriers, rag-pickers, and prostitutes.133 Some 40,000 children dismissed from the factories were never seen again.134 This example demonstrates that children’s right to be free from exploitation and their
right to survival should be balanced.
As the right to survival is a necessary condition for the enjoyment of
other rights, one may suggest that the right to survival should trump other
rights. But this logic fails in situations involving hazardous work, for
example, deep sea fishing. In the Philippines, a country of seven thousand
islands, children work in pa-aling, or deep sea fishing, where, carrying
hoses attached to a surface air compressor, children dive approximately
thirty to fifty feet without protective gear and chase fish into the nets.135
This exposes children to ear injuries, shark attacks, and drowning.136 The
example of deep-sea fishing shows that the very economic opportunity
that enables a child to earn a living and survive may, at the same time,
expose the child to occupational hazards, and thus, threaten the child’s
survival. The difficulty in balancing the two rights may be paralyzing for
the employer: regardless of whether the employer dismisses the child
from work or allows the child to work, the employer would in effect take
away the child’s rights.
The “best interests” principle helps to resolve this tension. This principle, as codified in the Convention on the Rights of the Child, provides
that, in all actions involving the child, the “best interests of the child
shall be a primary consideration.”137 The drafters’ use of the indefinite
article in the term “a primary consideration” shows that the child’s inter-

132. Shareen Hertel, New Moves in Transnational Advocacy: Getting Labor and Economic Rights on the Agenda in Unexpected Ways, 12 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 263, 267–68
(2006).
133. SEABROOK, supra note 49, 64–65; WORLD VISION UK, supra note 36, at 7.
134. Hertel, supra note 132, at 270. See also WORLD VISION UK, supra note 36, at 7
(discussing the consequences of dismissing children from work).
135. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FACES OF CHANGE: HIGHLIGHTS OF U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR EFFORTS TO COMBAT INTERNATIONAL CHILD LABOR 6 (2003).
136. Id.
137. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 29, art. 3(1). The “best interests” approach is the general principle of law common to many countries. Jacqueline
Rubellin-Devichi, The Best Interests Principle in French Law and Practice, in THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: RECONCILING CULTURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 44, at
259, 260.
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ests are not an overriding factor,138 but the choice of the word “consideration” (as opposed to “element” or “factor”) demonstrates that the
child’s interests “must actually be considered.”139 As such, this principle
accommodates various ideological, social, and cultural approaches in a
universal norm and demands the consideration of the child’s unique circumstances.140
The concept of children’s participatory rights may aid in ascertaining
such circumstances. The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides
for a bundle of participatory rights, namely, the freedom of expression,
conscience, and assembly.141 In essence, the concept of participatory
rights or “participation” requires that, depending on the child’s maturity,
the child should participate in decisions about his or her life142 and have
the opportunity to be “present or consulted.”143 As children have been
“the most photographed and the least listened to members of society,”144
the Convention’s codification of this broad range of participatory rights
is a step forward in the fulfillment of children’s rights.145
Participation empowers the child by including the child in the decisionmaking process concerning his or her life, which the following examples
illustrate. A nongovernmental organization (“NGO”), Save the Children
UK, which conducted evaluation missions in Honduras, Bangladesh, and
Burkina Faso, engaged children in data collection and found that children-interviewers can be “particularly effective as children may relate to

138. Philip Alston, The Best Interests Principle: Towards a Conciliation of Culture
and Human Rights, in THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: RECONCILING CULTURE AND
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 44, at 12, 12.
139. Id. at 13.
140. Id. at 16.
141. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 29, art. 13–15 (establishing the
freedom of expression; freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; freedom of association and peaceful assembly, respectively). See Rutkow & Lozman, supra note 124, at 165
(discussing children’s participatory rights codified in the Convention).
142. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 29, art. 12 (providing for the
right of the child “who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express
those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given
due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child”).
143. Anita Franklin & Patricia Sloper, Listening and Responding? Children’s Participation in Health Care Within England, in CHILDREN’S HEALTH AND CHILDREN’S RIGHTS,
11, 14 (Michael Freeman ed., 2006).
144. ROGER A. HART, CHILDREN’S PARTICIPATION: FROM TOKENISM TO CITIZENSHIP 9
(1992).
145. Cynthia Price Cohen, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child:
A Feminist Landmark, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 29, 49–50 (1997).
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each other in a more open way.”146 Another NGO, Undugu Society, organized group meetings for street children in Mathare Valley, a slum in
Nairobi, Kenya, who supported themselves by collecting plastic, scrap
metal, and paper bags around the city.147 In the course of these meetings,
children learned how to read a weighing scale and calculate the price of
what they were selling in order to avoid being cheated by the street buyers.148 The children ultimately decided to sell scrap metal directly to the
factory where the price would be fixed, making cheating less likely.149
These examples demonstrate that working children find ways to subsist
in a dangerous world on a daily basis, and therefore, they can help in
identifying realistic solutions to the child labor problem.
IV. CHILD LABOR STANDARDS IN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS
In addition to the ILO conventions and the Convention on the Rights
of the Child, several U.S. FTAs set forth child labor standards. Generally, parties entering into an FTA agree to eliminate tariffs and other barriers to trade in goods among themselves, facilitating easier access to
each other’s markets.150 This integration of regional trade regimes may
reveal inequalities in labor conditions in such regimes, which some FTAs
address by imposing labor standards, also referred to as “social clauses.”151 Alternatively, signatories to an FTA may choose to enter into a
side agreement with respect to labor standards, such as the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (“NAALC”).152 NAALC was the
first labor accord to supplement an FTA,153 namely, the 1992 North
American Free Trade Agreement between Canada, Mexico, and the
United States (“NAFTA”).154

146. SAVE THE CHILDREN, FINDING THE RIGHT TOOLS FOR THE JOB: LESSONS LEARNED
APPLICATION OF THE ILO CONVENTION 182 ON THE WORST FORMS OF CHILD
LABOUR, at i, 7 (2003).
147. HART, supra note 144, at 25.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. WILLIAM H. COOPER, FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: IMPACT ON U.S. TRADE AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. TRADE POLICY 2–5 (2004).
151. TSOGAS, supra note 63, at 19–20. See also Doumbia-Henry & Gravel, supra note
72, at 186, 189 (discussing enforcement of labor standards through trade agreements).
152. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Sept. 13,
1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499 [hereinafter NAALC].
153. LESLIE ALAN GLICK, UNDERSTANDING THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT 121 (2d ed. 1994).
154. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat.
2057.
ON THE
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The inclusion of labor standards in FTAs opens the possibility of using
trade sanctions as a mechanism for enforcing these standards155—an avenue unavailable under the ILO conventions. Under the ILO Constitution,
the ILO may recommend “such action as it may deem wise and expedient to secure compliance,”156 but the ILO has never imposed and, under
the current version of the ILO Constitution,157 does not have express authority to impose, economic sanctions.158 Currently, the United States is a
party to over a dozen bilateral and regional FTAs.159 These FTAs differ
in their approaches to the use of trade sanctions in enforcing child labor
standards, as NAALC, the 2000 U.S.-Jordan FTA,160 and the 2004 Central American-Dominican Republic-U.S. FTA161(“CAFTA-DR”) illustrate.
A. NAALC: The First Labor Accord to Accompany an FTA
NAALC was intended to address the concern of U.S. labor unions
about the potential accelerated migration of U.S. jobs to Mexico, where
the relatively high existing labor standards were inadequately enforced.162 This accord, however, does not establish new standards, and its

155. See Andrew T. Guzman, Trade Labor, Legitimacy, 91 CAL. L. REV. 885, 886–87
(2003) (observing that “trade sanctions may be the only effective way of establishing
core labor standards”).
156. Constitution of the International Labour Organisation, supra note 81, art. 33.
157. The first ILO Constitution contained a clause providing for economic enforcement measures. This clause was never used and in 1946 it was deleted. Steve Charnovitz,
The Influence of International Labor Standards on the World Trading Regime: A Historical Overview, 126 INT’L LAB. REV. 565, 575–76 (1987).
158. Christopher L. Erickson & Daniel J.B. Mitchell, Labor Standards and Trade
Agreements: U.S. Experience, 19 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 145, 149–51 (1998).
159. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/
Section_Index.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2008) (listing U.S. FTAs currently in force).
160. Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan, Oct. 24,
2000, 115 Stat. 243 [hereinafter U.S.-Jordan FTA].
161. Central American-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement,
May 28, 2004, 119 Stat. 462 [hereinafter CAFTA-DR].
162. Katherine A. Hagen, Fundamentals of Labor Issues and NAFTA, 27 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 917, 919–21 (1994); Joan M. Smith, North American Free Trade and the Exploitation of Working Children, 4 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 57, 67 (1994); Stanley M.
Spracker & Gregory M. Brown, Labor Issues Under the NAFTA: Options and Resolutions, in THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: A NEW FRONTIER IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN THE AMERICAS 351, 352–54, 365 (Judith H.
Bello et al. eds., 1994).
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effect in terms of improvement in the labor conditions has been limited.163
NAALC neither incorporates international child labor standards nor introduces minimum standards for the signatories’ domestic laws.164 Instead, the accord affirms the parties’ rights to establish their own labor
laws165: each party has to “ensure” that such laws provide for “high standards” and “strive to improve” them.166 NAALC identifies eleven “guiding principles”167 that the signatories agree to promote, including “labor
protections for children and young persons.”168 This principle requires
“the establishment of restrictions on the employment of children and
young persons that may vary taking into consideration relevant factors
likely to jeopardize the full physical, mental and moral development of
young persons, including schooling and safety requirements.”169 Neither
in this pronouncement nor elsewhere in the agreement does NAALC set
child labor abolition as a goal or specify the minimum age for employment of children.170
The enforcement mechanisms for these relatively weak standards are
toothless.171 NAALC expressly denies any party’s rights to “undertake
law enforcement activities” on another party’s territory172 and any right
to private actions in domestic legal systems.173 The NAALC signatories
agree to advance the guiding principles through collaboration, cooperation, and information exchange.174 For these purposes, NAALC creates
several procedures and bodies for dispute resolution through consultations and arbitration,175 including the Commission for Labor Cooperation.176 Under these procedures, however, it may take a dispute over three

163. Hagen, supra note 162, at 925; Thomas J. Manley & Ambassador Luis Lauredo,
International Labor Standards in Free Trade Agreements of the Americas, 18 EMORY
INT’L L. REV. 85, 104, 111, 113 (2004).
164. See NAALC, supra note 152; Hagen, supra note 162, at 925; Manley & Lauredo,
supra note 163, at 104; Smith, supra note 162, at 79, 86.
165. NAALC, supra note 152, art. 2.
166. Id.
167. Id. annex 1, pmbl.
168. Id. annex 1, para. 5.
169. Id.
170. See NAALC, supra note 152.
171. Hagen, supra note 162, at 927–30; Manley & Lauredo, supra note 163, at 105;
Spracker & Brown, supra note 162, at 365–66.
172. NAALC, supra note 152, art. 42.
173. Id. art. 43.
174. GLICK, supra note 153, at 121.
175. NAALC, supra note 152, arts. 27–41.
176. Id. art. 8.
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years to reach the stage where sanctions may be considered,177 and even
in that case, remedies in the form of monetary penalties and suspension
of trade benefits under NAFTA are limited to “persistent patterns” of
non-enforcement.178
Meanwhile, child labor in Mexico continues to be a problem.179 Between 1999 and 2005, sixteen percent of children ages five to fourteen in
Mexico were engaged in child labor.180 The majority of these children
worked for small companies, in agriculture and construction, where labor
enforcement is inadequate.181 A recent incident involving nine-year-old
David Salgado Aranda, as reported by the U.N. Children’s Fund, supports this contention.182 David migrated with his parents to Sinaloa,
northern Mexico, looking for seasonal work, similar to some 300,000
other migrant workers’ children ages six and older.183 While David was
working picking tomatoes, he was run over by a tractor and killed.184
David was too young to have been working on a commercial plantation.
As these reports and statistics illustrate, NAALC did not have the anticipated positive effect on labor conditions in Mexico.185 This instrument,
however, raised the issue of the protection of working children, which
was a step toward solving the child labor problem.
B. The High Watermark of Child Labor Standards: The U.S.-Jordan FTA
The subsequently concluded U.S.-Jordan FTA provides more stringent
labor protections than NAALC. The U.S.-Jordan FTA reaffirms the signatories’ obligations as ILO members,186 incorporates internationally
recognized minimum age standards,187 and contains a “no relaxation
177. GLICK, supra note 153, at 130; Spracker & Brown, supra note 162, at 372.
178. NAALC, supra note 152, arts. 27(1), 39, 49; Spracker & Brown, supra note 162,
at 370–72.
179. See BACON, supra note 42, at 16, 40–41 (discussing the problem of child labor in
Mexico).
180. U.N. CHILDREN’S FUND, THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S CHILDREN 134 (2006).
181. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, 2006
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, MEXICO (2007), http://www.state.gov/
g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78898.htm.
182. Thomas Nybo, Child Migrant Workers in Mexico Miss out on Education and a
Safe Environment, UNICEF, Mar. 2, 2007, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/mexico_3
8520.html.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Hagen, supra note 162, at 918–20; Don Wells, “Best Practice” in the Regulation
of International Labor Standards: Lessons of the U.S.-Cambodia Textile Agreement, 27
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 357, 358 (2006).
186. U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 160, art. 6(1).
187. Id. art. 6(6)(d).
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clause,” under which the parties may not weaken existing domestic labor
standards.188 The agreement enforces compliance with labor provisions
through trade sanctions.189 Due to its high standards and direct enforcement through trade sanctions, the U.S.-Jordan FTA has been characterized as the high watermark in FTA labor protections.190 The U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child has praised the measures for eliminating child labor in Jordan, including the enhancement of domestic child
labor laws in Jordan and establishment of a national database on child
labor.191 This FTA indicates that where the ILO, lacking the ability to
impose economic sanctions, fails to enforce international labor standards,
trade agreements could potentially take on this role.192
C. CAFTA-DR as a “Missed Opportunity”193 to Improve Labor Conditions
CAFTA-DR stands out among U.S. FTAs because it has created the
second-largest free trade area for U.S. exports in Latin America.194 In
terms of labor protections, CAFTA-DR is similar to NAALC in that it
only addresses the parties’ enforcement of their own “labor laws,”195
which CAFTA-DR defines to include the parties’ laws “directly related”
to the international minimum age requirements and the elimination of the
worst forms of child labor.196 CAFTA-DR subjects labor claims to dispute resolution procedures separate from those for commercial disputes197
188. Id. art. 6(2).
189. Id. art. 10.
190. Doumbia-Henry & Gravel, supra note 72, at 192; Manley & Lauredo, supra note
163, at 105–06; Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, Leveling the Playing Field: Labor Provisions in
CAFTA, 29 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 386, 440–42 (2006).
191. U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Consideration of Reports Submitted by
States Parties Under Article 44 of the Convention, paras. 6–7, 88–89, 43d Sess., U.N.
Doc. CRC/C/JOR/CO/3 (Sept. 29, 2006).
192. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
193. H.R. REP. NO. 109-182, at 46 (2005).
194. Pagnattaro, supra note 190, at 386.
195. CAFTA-DR, supra note 161, art. 16.2(1)(a).
196. Id. art. 16.8. Each signatory promises to “strive to ensure” that it does not derogate from its labor laws in a way that “reduces adherence” to the international standards
referenced in the FTA, but each party retains discretion over “investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory and compliance matters.” Id. arts. 16.2(1)(b), 16.2(2).
197. Under CAFTA-DR, an aggrieved party has to first seek consultations with another party and, if that fails, escalate the issue to the Labor Affairs Council—a body “comprising cabinet-level or equivalent representatives” of the signatories (or their designees),
and overseeing labor matters under CAFTA-DR. CAFTA-DR, supra note 161, arts. 16.4,
16.6(1), 16.6(4), 16.6(8). CAFTA-DR establishes a Labor Cooperation and Capacity
Building Mechanism to advance capacity building activities in the area of labor stan-
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and does not authorize trade sanctions for labor violations.198 Instead,
CAFTA-DR contains a provision for “monetary assessment” payable to a
fund that CAFTA-DR creates,199 which means that such assessment is
not payable to the aggrieved party.200 Additionally, CAFTA-DR caps
such monetary assessment at fifteen million U.S. dollars per year.201 For
its failure to establish and strictly enforce labor standards, this FTA has
been criticized in the United States as inadequate.202
A representative of the National Labor Committee, a U.S. NGO whose
mission is to help “defend the human rights of workers in the global
economy,”203 recently visited the Legumex factory in Guatemala, a signatory to CAFTA-DR.204 The Legumex factory processes fruits and vegetables for export to the United States.205 Through reports of the National
Labor Committee, the international community learned that at the factory, thirteen-year-old children were working twelve-hour shifts, wearing
only t-shirts in an area surrounded by food freezers.206 A child worker
cutting vegetables for the U.S. consumer has to cut every head of broccoli into ninety-seven pieces in sixty-four seconds, thus, making one cut
every seven-tenths of a second throughout the shift.207 For the duration of
their twelve-hour shifts, children cutting watermelons stand in an inch of
watermelon juice dripping from the cutting tables, children’s wrists swollen and their feet cracked and bleeding.208 These findings support the
contention that CAFTA-DR was “a missed opportunity”209 in improving
labor conditions in CAFTA-DR countries.

dards, but the lack of funding of this mechanism has undermined its significance. Pagnattaro, supra note 190, at 432.
198. See CAFTA-DR, supra note 161, ch. 16; Pagnattaro, supra note 190, at 432.
199. CAFTA-DR, supra note 161, art. 20.17(4).
200. Id.
201. Id. art. 20.17(2).
202. Kolben, supra note 71, at 203–04; Pagnattaro, supra note 190, at 432.
203. The National Labor Committee “investigates and exposes human and labor rights
abuses committed by U.S. companies producing goods in the developing world.” The
National Labor Committee, Mission Statement, http://www.nlcnet.org/aboutus.php (last
visited Oct. 15, 2008).
204. PBC Films, Harvest of Shame: Report Accuses Child Labor Abuses in Guatemala, Mar. 13, 2007, http://www.pbcfilms.com/Harvest_of_Shame.php.
205. Id.
206. The National Labor Committee reports that the employer did not allow children to
wear sweaters because of the fear that lint from the sweaters could get onto the products.
Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. H.R. REP. NO. 109-182, at 46.
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To conclude, U.S. FTAs that contain provisions concerning working
children generally do not set new child labor standards. These agreements, however, encourage the signatories to comply with existing standards and raise awareness regarding child labor issues. Some FTAs also
enforce child labor standards through trade sanctions.
V. CORPORATE COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL CHILD LABOR
STANDARDS
As international child labor standards are evolving, TNCs seeking to
manage their litigation and reputational risks should incorporate these
standards into their compliance programs. The purpose of a compliance
program is to ensure that individual and collective behavior within the
corporation follows applicable laws.210 In a compliance program, the focus
is on development of specific business processes and internal mechanisms that proactively prevent and avoid violations of law.211
Compliance programs should be distinguished from codes of conduct
and other ethical business initiatives. Numerous TNCs, including Bridgestone Corporation212 and Gap Inc.,213 have adopted codes of conduct—
“statements of company policy”214 announcing the company’s commitment to ethical business conduct.215 Similarly to codes of conduct, various
“labeling” initiatives certify manufacturers and producers that comply
with child labor standards. For example, the international NGO RugMark
Foundation certifies child-labor compliant carpet manufacturers in South
Asia.216 These ethical business initiatives contribute to the goal of child
labor abolition, but differ from compliance programs in that ethical business initiatives are voluntary and primarily designed as a marketing

210. JAY A. SIGLER & JOSEPH E. MURPHY, INTERACTIVE CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 56,
104 (1988).
211. Id. at 47–48, 79–81, 104.
212. Bridgestone Americas Holding, Inc., Mission, Vision and Values, http://www.
bridgestone-firestone.com/about_index.asp?id=about/mvv (last visited Oct. 15, 2008).
213. GAP INC., CODE OF BUSINESS CONDUCT (2005), available at http://www.gapinc.
com/public/documents/Code_English.pdf; Gap Inc., Code of Vendor Conduct, http://www.
gapinc.com/public/documents/code_vendor_conduct.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2008).
214. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, THE APPAREL INDUSTRY AND CODES OF CONDUCT: A
SOLUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CHILD LABOR PROBLEM?, at i (1996).
215. See Lance Compa & Tashia Hinchliffe-Darricarrère, Enforcing International
Labor Rights Through Corporate Codes of Conduct, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 663,
674–85 (1995) (examining the codes of conduct of Levi Strauss & Co., Reebok Corp.,
and Starbucks Coffee Co.).
216. RugMark Foundation, http://www.rugmark.org (last visited Oct. 15, 2008).

2008]

INTERNATIONAL CHILD LABOR REGULATION

233

tool.217 In contrast, compliance programs focus on internal policies and
procedures guiding TNCs’ employees and suppliers and reflecting specific legal standards.
To create a compliance program, TNCs first need to identify the applicable child labor standards and establish measures implementing these
standards in TNCs’ practices and supplier reviews. As the Gap Inc. incident demonstrates,218 TNCs also need to develop procedures governing
their response to child labor incidents.
A. Identifying and Implementing Applicable Standards
As the analysis of treaties and conventions pertaining to child labor
shows, three categories of child labor violate international law219: the
unconditional worst forms of child labor,220 “hazardous work,”221 and
employment of children under a minimum age (which may be set between fifteen and twelve, depending on the States’ international obligations and domestic regulation).222 Based on the definitions of these categories, the bonded child labor allegedly involved in the Gap Inc. incident
should fall under the realm of the unconditional worst forms of child labor.
The engagement of children in the application of pesticides and fertilizers
without protective equipment, as alleged in Bridgestone,223 may violate
international law as a practice exposing children to hazardous substances.
This shows that despite the fact that international child labor standards
set the outer limits of permissible labor practices involving youth, TNCs
may confront situations where the international standards are violated.
To comply with these standards, TNCs should implement more stringent screening and monitoring measures. The initial supplier screening
should extend beyond the inspection of the suppliers’ records and premises. Record review or a single visit to the supplier’s factory would not
reveal, for instance, that children at the factory use their relatives’ employee numbers to appear on the books as adult workers or that the sup-

217. See TSOGAS, supra note 63, at 11 (“[T]he ‘ethical consumer,’ sensitized to human
rights and environmental issues, sees shopping as a complement to (or substitute for)
other forms of direct social activity.”).
218. McDougall, supra note 13.
219. ILC, A Future Without Child Labor, supra note 86, at 9.
220. Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, supra note 28, art. 3.
221. Id. art. 3(d); Minimum Age Convention, supra note 84, art. 3; ILO Worst Forms
of Child Labour Recommendation (No. 190), supra note 110; ILO Minimum Age Recommendation (No. 146), supra note 95.
222. Minimum Age Convention, supra note 84, arts. 2(3), 4(2), 5(1), 7. See also ILC,
A Future Without Child Labor, supra note 86, at 9–10.
223. Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988 (S.D. Ind. 2007).
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plier may keep a second set of records, which easily “bamboozle”224
TNCs. To avoid this, TNCs can use accounting and social monitoring
firms experienced in evaluating supply-chain risk and compliance with
child labor standards.225 The contract with the supplier should address
this concern and include the supplier’s on-going certification of compliance with international and local child labor laws226 and a provision
giving TNCs’ representatives, such as social monitoring firms, the right
to inspect the supplier’s premises and records at any time without prior
notice to the supplier.
TNCs or their representatives should conduct follow-up visits to the
supplier’s factory. To that end, TNCs should maintain a current list of all
production sites of its suppliers. For instance, the policy of IKEA, an international furniture and home products franchise,227 requires suppliers to
disclose the locations of all production sites.228 This policy should extend
to the suppliers’ subcontractors as well. In order to ensure the accuracy
of information on child labor compliance that the suppliers provide to the
TNCs’ headquarters, TNCs may engage local unions in the monitoring
process.229 TNCs may arrange training sessions for the suppliers’ workers
to increase their awareness with respect to child labor issues. To improve
incident reporting, TNCs may establish a hotline or other anonymous
reporting system, such as an independent worker survey.230 These measures will ensure that the TNC’s management is aware of the TNC’s and
its suppliers’ labor practices and can timely respond to any potential violations.

224. Robyn Blumner, New Standards for Trade Agreements May Not Change Much,
SALT LAKE TRIB., May 26, 2007, available at http://www.nlcnet.org/article.php?id=324.
225. See, e.g., Cal Safety Compliance Corporation, http://www.cscc-online.com (last
visited Nov. 10, 2008) (providing that “CSCC is dedicated to helping our clients build
secure and socially responsible relationships with their supply chain partners”).
226. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SMALL CHANGE: BONDED CHILD LABOR IN INDIA’S
SILK INDUSTRY (2003), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/india/ (providing recommendations to the international community with respect to child labor policies).
227. Inter IKEA Systems B.V., http://franchisor.ikea.com (last visited Oct. 23, 2008).
228. IKEA SERVICES AB, IKEA’S POSITION ON CHILD LABOR (2003), 1, http://www.ikea.
com/ms/en_AU/about_ikea_new/about/read_our_materials/ikea_position_child_labour.p
df (“The supplier must agree to provide lists of all places of production.”).
229. See Risa L. Lieberwitz, Linking Trade and Labor Standards: Prioritizing the
Right of Association, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 641, 648–49 (2006) (discussing the role of
unions in promoting labor rights).
230. See, e.g., Gap Inc., Code Hotline, http://www.gapinc.com/public/Investors/inv_
compliance_hotline.shtml (last visited Oct. 15, 2008) (describing a hotline dedicated to
reports of violations of the Code of Business Conduct).
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B. Responding to Child Labor Incidents
When a TNC discovers child labor incidents in its own or its suppliers’
labor practices, the TNC’s remedial and follow-up measures should take
into consideration children’s rights, such as the right to be free from exploitation231 and the right to survival and an adequate standard of living.232
To balance these rights, the TNC should engage the affected children in a
discussion about possible solutions to the problem233 and assure that the
best interests of the child are given a primary consideration.234 Following
this approach, TNCs may find that an instant severing of ties with a noncompliant supplier or immediate dismissal of children from the
workplace without creation of any alternatives to work may not, on balance, benefit the children.
While under certain circumstances, withdrawal and dismissal may be a
justified measure, it may not constitute a sound policy if applied alone
and without a case-by-case determination. Admittedly, withdrawal from
a relationship with a noncompliant supplier or removal of children from
work may be perceived as mitigating the TNC’s potential liability and
deterring future noncompliance on the part of other suppliers. According
to Gap Inc., for example, in 2006, it severed ties with twenty-three noncompliant factories.235 TNCs, however, are increasingly recognizing the
limitations of this approach.
The solution to the child labor problem should take into consideration
the best interests of the child and focus on creating meaningful alternatives
for children dismissed from work. The apparel and accessories retailer
H&M Hennes & Mauritz AB (“H&M”),236 for instance, reports that
when it discovers “underage workers” at its supplier’s site, H&M, in cooperation with the supplier, contacts the family of the affected child and
seeks a solution in the child’s best interests.237 One such solution has
been allowing the child to continue education and paying wages to the
child’s family during the study period until the child reaches the appro-

231. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 29, art. 19.
232. Id. art. 6(2).
233. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
235. Press Release, Gap Inc., supra note 14.
236. H&M, About H&M, http://www.hm.com/us/abouthm__abouthm.nhtml (last visited Oct. 23, 2008).
237. H&M, Supply Chain Monitoring, What Do We Do If We Find Child Labor Being
Used?, http://www.hm.com/us/corporateresponsibility/supplychainworkingconditions/supply
chainmonitoring/whatwedoifwediscoverchildlabour__monotoringarticle4.nhtml (last visited
Oct. 23, 2008).
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priate age.238 Similarly, to address the child labor issue at its suppliers’
plants, Levi Strauss & Co., a multinational apparel company,239 made a
decision to pay for the children’s education and school supplies until
they reach a minimum age when they would be offered a job at the
plant.240 These capacity-building measures, providing resources and
creating opportunities for the implementation of child labor standards in
the local communities,241 serve the goals of child labor abolition more
effectively than mere dismissal of child laborers from work.
Development of capacity-building measures presents a fertile ground
for creative solutions. In rural areas in developing countries, for instance,
children often have to walk long distances to get to school,242 and simply
providing basic transportation may increase the chances that these children will continue attending school, as opposed to joining the workforce
too early. In identifying these solutions, TNCs may partner up with
NGOs that have experience in capacity building. Starbucks Corporation,
an international coffee retailer and coffee-house chain,243 for example,
partnered with Save the Children USA, an international relief and development organization, in bringing bilingual education to Mayan communities in Guatemala,244 which will expand the employment prospects for
children in these communities.
Although these measures increase the TNCs’ immediate cost of doing
business, such cost is unlikely to be prohibitive. Generally, compliance
programs incur costs, but are necessary for the business in order to avoid
litigation, regulatory, and reputational risks. Additionally, by operating
or otherwise doing business in jurisdictions with cheaper labor (where
incidents of child labor are more likely) TNCs already reduce their labor
costs and reap other benefits of globalization, a process that “has generated vast fortunes” for TNCs.245 The cost-benefit analysis of the measures
addressing the child labor problem should take into account this relative
reduction in overall costs, as well as other factors related to economic
disparities between developed and developing countries such as the relative cost of living. The National Labor Committee estimates that an extra
payment of twenty-five cents per garment paid by U.S. retailers to Ban238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Id.
Levi Strauss & Co., http://www.levistrauss.com (last visited Oct. 23, 2008).
Compa & Hinchliffe-Darricarrère, supra note 215, at 679.
WORLD VISION UK, supra note 36, at 10.
ILO, World Day Against Child Labour, supra note 30.
Starbucks Corporation, http://www.starbucks.com (last visited Oct. 23, 2008).
STARBUCKS CORPORATION, BEYOND THE CUP: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
FISCAL 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 6, 40 (2005).
245. Hiatt & Greenfield, supra note 71, at 40–41.
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gladeshi vendors would provide the Bangladeshi economy with assistance eight times exceeding the current U.S. aid,246 and thus, create new
economic opportunities. In return, capacity-building measures will have
a positive long-term effect on these communities, which will benefit the
TNCs by developing the future workforce.
CONCLUSION
TNCs are increasingly becoming aware of the litigation and reputational risks posed by the use of child labor in TNCs’ and their suppliers’
international operations. There are hardly any “quick fixes”247 in this area
because child labor issues are rooted in social and economic problems
such as the lack of resources and opportunities. In developing countries,
children have to work to support themselves and their families, and thus,
child labor is a problem of development rather than merely an issue of
corporate misfeasance. This understanding is important for instilling the
need for TNCs to take measures that anticipate and address potential
child labor incidents. Using the guidance provided in treaties pertaining
to working youth, TNCs should approach child labor proactively, resist
distancing themselves from this problem, and embrace the opportunity to
create meaningful alternatives for child laborers.
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